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A tall banner hanging in the main reading room of the
Notre Dame law library reads: "If you want peace, work for jus-
tice." Recent events in Los Angeles following the Rodney King
verdict support the proposition embroidered on the banner that
perceived injustice can carry a terrible price. In the context of
jury selection, the Supreme Court has said that justice requires
that prospective jurors not be struck from the jury solely because
of their race' or sex.' Some commentators believe that a just
verdict may require more affirmative steps to ensure representa-
tion of certain groups (i.e. racial minorities) on the jury.3 Both
the absence of a statute requiring mixed juries and the Court's
often failing efforts to police against discrimination in the selec-
tion process4 have prompted many commentators to propose
both minor and extensive modifications to the current process,
including some innovative new ways of conducting jury selection.
The ultimate purpose of this Note is to propose a new
method of jury selection which balances the competing needs of
impartial selection and fair representation. Toward that end,
section II will briefly review the influence of race on the jury sys-
tem and how the Supreme Court has endeavored (with only par-
tial success) to address the tendency of attorneys to use race as a
leading reason for exercising their peremptory challenges.
Given the courts' limited success in policing racial use of per-
emptory challenges, section III in broad strokes portrays the
landscape of alternatives which have been proposed to modify or
replace the existing Batson system of peremptory challenges. In
addition, section III will discuss the primary criticisms which have
been leveled at the various proposals. Finally, section IV pro-
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1. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
2. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
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1611, 1640 (1985).
4. See, e.g., Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 356 (1991).
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poses a new method ofjury selection replacing the negative per-
emptory power of attorneys with a combination of random forces
and affirmative choice.
H. THE PROBLEM
A. Color Makes a Difference in the Judicial System
The reality is that race plays a significant role in the judicial
process.5 The effect is simple: racial bias tends to color both the
way jurors see facts and how they perceive defendants,' ulti-
mately affecting the probability of a given defendant being found
guilty." "It would appear that white Uurors] tend to assume less
favorable characteristics about black defendants than white
defendants and that such assumptions contribute to these
Uurors'] greater tendency to find black defendants guilty."s Jus-
tice O'Connor acknowledged the effects of race, writing,
"[C]onscious and unconscious racism can affect the way white
jurors perceive minority defendants and the facts presented at
their trials, perhaps determining the verdict of guilt or
innocence." 9
What Justice O'Connor called "unconscious racism" could
be more benignly explained in that "[w] hat may appear to white
jurors as a black defendant's implausible story may ring true to
black jurors with greater knowledge of the context and norms of
black experience."' "Who a juror is and what she has exper-
5. Jerome Culp, Jr., Toward a Black Leal Scholarship: Race and Original
Understandings, 91 Dux LJ. 39 (1991).
6. See, e.g., JEFnmY T. FtEDERICK, Tim PsyiioIocw OF THE AmmcAN Jum,
241-301 (1987); SAuL M. KASSrN & LAwRENcE S. WRIGHTSmAN, THE AMrcIAN
JURY ON TRIAi: PsYc-oLoGIcAL PERSPECTIVES 99-117 (1988); see also Judge
Stanley M. Weisberg, Out of the Fying Pan or Into the Fire? Race and Choice of Venue
After Rodney King 106 Harv. L. Rev. 705, 711 (1993).
7. See, e.g., Douglas L Colbert, Challenging the Challenge: Thisenth
Amendment as a Prohibiton Against the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76
CosEmi.L L. REv. 1, 112-15 (1990).
8. Johnson, supra note 3, at 1640. Other commentators place the
difference on social status rather than race. SeeJames M. Gleason & Victor A.
Harris, Race, Socio-Economic Status and Prceived Similarity as Determinants of
Judgments by Simulated Jurors, 3 Soc. BaHAv. & PERsoNAury 175, 178 (1975);
Mary V. McGuire & Gordon Bermant, Individual and Group Decisions in Response
to A Mock Trik a MethodologicalNote, 7J. APP=rr Soc. PSoCHOL. 220, 224 (1977).
9. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, (1992) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
See also id. at 2360 (Thomas, J., concurring). ("Simply stated, securing
representation of the defendant's race on the jury may help to overcome racial
bias and provide the defendant with a better chance of having a fair trial.").
10. VALERiE P. HANS & Nmn. VmmAi, JumNc TEJURY 51 (1986). See also
Cassel v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 301.02 (1950) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("The trial
jury hears the evidence of both sides and chooses what it will believe. In so
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ienced almost certainly influences what she accepts as plausible
'fact.'"11 This is not to say that any one perspective should con-
trol. Indeed, Justice Marshall characterized the absence of any
voice in society as a terrible loss. He wrote:
When any large and identifiable segment of the commu-
nity is excluded from jury service, the effect is to remove
from the jury room qualities of human nature and varieties
of human experience, the range of which is unknown and
perhaps unknowable. It is not necessary to assume that the
excluded group will consistently vote as a class in order to
conclude, as we do that its exclusion deprives the jury of a
perspective on human events that may have unsuspected
importance in any case .... 12
Justice Marshall did not overstate the power of diversity. Even a
small minority presence on a jury can minimize the effects of
race on jury deliberations.1 " While three or four minority mem-
bers of ajury can easily stand against a larger group, the presence
of even one minority member can affect the deliberations of the
group.1
4
While a racially mixed jury could overcome many of the
overt and covert effects of racism in the jury room, the unfortu-
nate fact that race can affect jury outcomes is magnified by the
consistent underrepresentation of minorities in every phase of
the jury selection process. 5 From the drawing ofjury districts to
the formulation ofjuror source lists,' 6 minorities never find their
way into this process in numbers consistent with their percentage
of the population.'
7
deciding, it is influenced by imponderables-unconscious and conscious
prejudices and preferences-and a thousand things we cannot detect or isolate
in its verdict and whose influence we cannot weigh.").
11. Burt Neuborne, Of Sausage Factories and Syllogism Machines: Fonmalism,
Realism, and Eicclusionaty Selection Techniques, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 419, 431-32
(1992).
12. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503-04 (1972).
13. Johnson, supra note 3, at 1628.
14. Id. at 1698.
15. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (The protection of a
jury trial is "not provided if the jury pool is made up of only special segments of
the populace or if large, distinctive groups are excluded from the pool.").
16. See, e.g., U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABsTRACT OF THE
UNTFD STATES 1992, 269 (112th ed. 1992) (stating that smaller percentages of
African-Americans vote and that jury selection based on voter lists
underrepresents African Americans).
17. Nancy J. King, Racial Jurnandering. Cancer or Cure? A Contemnporaiy
Revie of Affimative Action injury Selection, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 707 (1993). (In a
leading article weighing the constitutional viability of various forms of
affirmative action in jury selection, Professor King traces the consistent
1997]
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Against this backdrop of minority underrepresentation
enters the staggering power of peremptory challenges."8
Unchecked racial use of peremptory challenges can easily wipe
out any minority presence that was able to survive the discrimina-
tory impact of the preceding phases of jury selection. With a
venire already thin on minorities, few peremptories are needed
to eliminate the remaining minority potential jurors and seat an
all-white jury. One study goes so far as to say that "the discrimi-
natory use of peremptory challenges is the single most significant
means by which racial prejudice and bias are injected into the
jury selection system."' 9
The result of an unchecked, racially charged jury selection
process is that in some districts minorities would not sit on juries.
Society pays a high price for the absence of minorities on
juries.2 0 Riots on the streets of Los Angeles after the King ver-
dict illustrate the price of perceived injustice.2 Beyond the dan-
gers of perceived injustice the absence of minorities presents the
risk of real injustice: that innocent black men might be con-
victed. A short survey of the Supreme Court's current response
should be helpful to understand the need for new solutions to
racial underrepresentation.
B. The Batson Solution
The Supreme Court has found discriminatory use of per-
emptory challenges to be problematic on two constitutional
underrepresentation of minorities at every phase of the jury selection process.
Initially the discretion vested in prosecutors or trial judges to select between
multiple venues present opportunity for discrimination.) See generally WAYNE R.
LAFAvE &JERoLD H. ISRAEL, CRMuNAL PRoCEnuE 737-60 (2d ed. 1992). Source
lists typically drawn from voter registration lists usually underrepresent
minorities. Id. at n.15.
18. A peremptory challenge allows an attorney to remove a potential
juror without justification.
19. Theodore McMillian & Christopher J. Petrini, Batson v. Kentucky: A
Promise Unfidfilled, 58 UMKC L. REv. 361, 363 (1990). See also Albert W.
Alschuler, Racial Quotas and the Juy, 44 DUKE LJ. 704, 724 (1995) ("When both
sides have an equal number of challenges, an advocate seeking the exclusion of
a minority group is more likely to achieve her objective than an advocate
seeking the exclusion of the majority.") (Citations omitted).
20. Deborah A. Ramirez, The Mixed Juy and the Ancient Custom of Trial by
Juty De Medietate Linguae: A History and a Proposal for Change, 74 B.U. L. REv. 777,
799 (1994) ("[T]he concept of a racially mixed jury creates a civic benefit:
requiring jurors of different ethnic and racial backgrounds to work together as
equals will debunk racial stereotypes.").
21. Paul Lieberman & Richard O'Reilly, One Year After the Riots, LA.
Tains, May 2, 1993, at Al. See generally, G.W. Hoon, Commentary, 1982 Cium. L.
REv. 681 (1982).
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grounds: the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of an impartial
jury2 2 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.2 The Sixth Amendment, traditionally focusing on
the rights of the defendant, was the basis of the Supreme Court's
initial condemnation of racial use of peremptory challenges. 4
The Equal Protection Clause has been a more complicated vehi-
cle for criticism of peremptory abuse. Initially, the Court used
the Equal Protection Clause to focus on the rights of the defend-
ant not to have potential jurors of the defendant's race struck
solely because of their race.25 More recently, the Court has used
the Equal Protection Clause as a vehicle for protecting the rights
of would-be jurors who are struck from the venire on the basis of
race. 26 This shift toward focusing on protecting would-be jurors
has unfortunately been coupled with a shift away from the argu-
ment that discrimination injury selection affects trial outcomes.
In the absence of legislative initiative, the evolution of Supreme
Court logic has diminished the likelihood that jury selection pro-
cedures will yield racially proportional juries. To understand the
need for reform, a brief tour of that evolution is necessary.
22. See infra note 24.
23. See infra note 25.
24. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 696 (1975) ("Our inquiry is
whether the presence of a fair cross section of the community on venires,
panels, of lists from which petit juries are drawn is essential to the fulfillment of
the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of an impartial jury trial. .. ."). Id.
25. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86-87 n.8 (1986) ("The Equal
Protection Clause guarantees the defendant that the State will not exclude
members of his race from the jury venire on account of race .... Purposeful
racial discrimination in selection of the venire violates a defendants' right to
equal protection because it denies him the protection that a trial by jury is
intended to secure.") (emphasis added). See also Louisiana v. Taylor, 419 U.S.
522 (1975); Smith, infra note 32, at 891 ("The Sixth Amendment test generally
mirrors that of equal protection" in requiring proof of discrimination, but
"under the Sixth Amendment, the defendant need not establish inferences of
purposeful discrimination.").
26. Three recent cases have shifted the Court's approach to protecting
the rights of potential jurors not to be excluded from sitting on a jury because
of their race. (Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992); Powers v. Ohio, 500
U.S. 614 (1991); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
Many commentators agree that the Equal Protection Clause provides a more
consistent platform for addressing jury makeup. See V. Amar, Jury Senice as
Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80 CoR, u. L. REv. 203, 204-9 (1995)
(arguing that the shift toward Equal Protection Clause and paramount concern
for rights of would-be jurors over concern for defendants comes from difficulty
in using the 6th (defendant intensive) as a constitutional framework for jury
selection issues). For an excellent comparison of a Sixth Amendment versus
Equal Protection Clause framework for jury selection issues, see Barbara D.
Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination in Juy Selection: Whose Right Is It
Anyway?, 92 COLUM. L. Rxv. 725 (1992)).
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1. The First Attempt: Swain v. Alabama
The Court's first look at the problem of minority exclusion
from juries came in 188027 when the Court held that pur-
poseful s exclusion of members of the defendant's race from the
jury constituted a denial of the defendant's equal protection
under the Fourteenth Amendment.' This general pronounce-
ment, however, provided no mechanism for challenging lop-
sided juries. Eighty-five years passed with little attention or
development of the general Strauder rule against purposeful
exclusion. Finally, in 1965, the Court, in Swain v. Alabama °
articulated a process for determining if a prosecutor had pur-
posefully removed jurors on the basis of race."1
Under Swain, to establish the prima facie case for purposeful
racial exclusion, the defendant must show that the state's per-
emptory system itself violated the Equal Protection Clause and
that the prosecutor, "whatever the circumstances, whatever the
crime and whoever the defendant or victim may be, is responsi-
ble for the removal of Negroes . . . with the result that no
Negroes ever serve on petit juries ... .""
Swain's "almost insurmountable burden"3 met with immedi-
ate and consistent criticism because it imposed what later courts
would describe as a "crippling burden of proof." ' The burden
27. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
28. Equal Protection Clause violations require showing of intent. See
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
256-66 (1977).
29. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 310 ("Concluding, therefore, that the statute of
West Virginia, discriminating in the selection of jurors, as it does, against
Negroes because of their color, amounts to a denial of the equal protection of
the laws to a colored man when he is put upon trial for an alleged offense
against the State.").
30. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
31. Id. at 223.
32. Id. The Court in Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977), produced
a three-part test for prima fade case of an Equal Protection Clause violation:
first, the challenger of a state's system must show that a recognizable, distinct
class has been singled out for different treatment under state law (written or
applied); second, the challenger must show significant under-representation
over a significant period of time differing from proportion in total population;
finally, the challenger must show that the process is susceptible to abuse or is
not racially neutral. See also Louis N. Smith, Final Report of the Hennepin County
Attorny's Task Force on Racial Composition of the Grand Jury, 16 H uimE L. REv.
879, 889 (1993).
33. See Clara L. Meek, The Use ofPeremptoy Challenges to Exclude Blachsfiom
PetitJuries in Civil Actions, The Case for Striking Peremptoy Strikes, 4 REv. Lrri. 175,
182 (1994).
34. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 92 (1986).
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of proving the consistent and intentional exclusion of minorities
beyond the strikes in the defendant's own case was magnified by
the fact that generally no records of a venire's racial makeup
were kept.' Even in Swain itself, it was not enough that no
blacks had been on any jury under that prosecutor for over ten
years. The difficulty comes in that the defendant must show the
absence was the result of intentional discrimination by the prose-
cutor alone. The difficulty of proving the prima facie case under
Swain is best illustrated by these statistics: from 1966-1984 only
two of seventy-five cases (both against the same prosecutor) met
the Swain standard.' Moreover, the only success came when the
prosecutor had admitted that he always struck all blacks from the
jury. 7 Peremptory challenges against minorities were more or
less freely exercised under the unworkable Swain system.
2. Batson
In 1986 the Supreme Court changed the rules, overruling
Swain in Batson v. Kentucky.' Batson improved on Swain by
"lower[ing] the burden of proof need[ed] to establish the dis-
criminatory use of a peremptory challenge." 9 Under Batson, "a
defendant may establish a prima facie case solely on evidence
concerning the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges
at the defendant's trial,"' making the process for proving pur-
poseful discrimination much friendlier to challengers.
Under Batson, a challenge goes through two stages. First,
the challenger establishes the prima facie case by "rais[ing] the
necessary inference of purposeful discrimination."4" To do this
the challenger must first show that the juror is a "member of a
cognizable racial group. "42 Then, the challenger can use any rel-
35. See Robert L. Doyel, In Search of a Remedy for the Racially Discriminatory
Use of Peremptory Challenges, 38 OKLA. L. REv. 385, 405 (1985).
36. State v. Washington, 375 So.2d 1162 (La. 1979); State v. Brown, 371
So.2d 751 (La. 1979).
37. See Doyel, supra note 35, at 405.
38. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97.
39. Charles J. Ogletree, Just Say No!: A Proposal to Eliminate Racially
Discriminatoy Uses of Peremptory Challenges, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1099, 1101
(1994).
40. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
41. I&
42. Id. See Ogletree, supra note 39, at n.25 ("Since everyone is a member
of some cognizable racial group, this must mean either that two or more struck
jurors must be members of the same cognizable racial group, or that the struck
juror must be a member of a cognizable racial group that is un-represented or
under-represented on the jury.").
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evant facts43 to show that the prosecutor's strikes "raise an infer-
ence that the prosecutor used [her peremptories] to exclude the
veniremen [of the defendant's race] from the petit jury on
account of race."" Second, if the court, "consider[ing] all rele-
vant circumstances,"4' finds the challenger to have made a
prima facie showing, "the burden shifts to the State to come for-
ward with a neutral explanation for challenging the black
jurors."' Batson lowers the standard of proof both by allowing
the challenger to use evidence only from her own case to meet
the prima facie case and by requiring that the evidence raise only
an inference of racial peremptory use. Batson greatly improved
the chances of minority representation on juries, but the pros-
pects for proportional minority representation remain dim.
Problems both inherent to Batson and caused by the evolution of
Batson keep minority representation dangerously low.
a. Problems with Batson
Perhaps the strongest criticism of the Batson system is the
ease with which a prosecutor can offer a pretextual, race-neutral
explanation for what in reality are discriminatory strikes. In one
case, for example, a prosecutor struck all Spanish speaking
potential jurors claiming that he "felt that from their answers
they would be hard pressed to accept what the interpreter said as
the final thing on what the record would be."47 Commenting on
the problem of pretext in this case, Justice Stevens wrote: "[T] o
the extent that the Supreme Court allows any race-neutral expla-
nation to rebut claims of discrimination, the Batson doctrine will
allow litigants to eviscerate its principles by fabricating racially
neutral explanations for excluding potential jurors on the basis
of race."4
In State v. McRae,49 the only African-American in the jury
pool was struck after the following questions by the prosecutor:
[Prosecutor:] Did you also understand that there may be
certain jurors who have certain feelings or attitudes about
whatever . . . that they couldn't for example, find some-
body guilty because they just don't think the system is fair
43. Even relying "solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor's exercise
of peremptory challenges at the defendant's trial." Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. I& at 97.
47. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 356 (1991).
48. Id. at 378-79 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
49. 494 N.W.2d 252 (Minn. 1992).
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[Potential juror:] I understand that.
[Prosecutor:] Okay. Knowing what you know about, you
know, your belief that the system maybe isn't perfect,
should I be concerned? Is it something where you don't
think you could convict him if he's proven-
[Potential juror:] No, no, no.
[Prosecutor:] Okay.
[Potential juror:] I would base my judgment on the
evidence.50
Following Batson procedure, the judge allowed the prosecu-
tor to offer nondiscriminatory reasons for striking the potential
juror. The prosecutor responded that the potential juror "had
an attitude that where she thought that basically, the system is
unfair to minorities, and the defendant's being black is-and her
being black would overcompensate by basically letting this guy
off."51 Additionally, the prosecutor indicated that the potential
juror "thinks the whole jury process is [a] fraud."52 The judge
accepted these explanations and allowed the peremptory
strike.53
The temptation to use peremptory challenges to remove all
potential jurors of the defendant's race should be readily appar-
ent, unfortunately:
the Court in Batson and its progeny has consistently under-
estimated the interest litigants will have in attempting to
evade Batson with pretexts .... Strikingjurors on the basis
of race or gender is not always an irrational act; it can
sometimes be... in keeping with the litigant's goals, and
would simply be part of effective advocacy were it not
entirely repugnant to the values and standards of the Con-
stitution, values that should and do override the litigant's
interest in winning.5 4
To complicate the pretext problem, the Court has done lit-
tle to guide lower courts in determining a lawyer's intent in the
absence of an admission of misconduct, leaving lawyers to hold
to the "tradition of arbitrary strikes and allow[ing] peremptory
challenges in doubtful cases. Batson has become impotent in
preventing discrimination. " "
50. McRae, 494 N.W.2d at 254-55.
51. Id. at 256.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Ogletree, supra note 39, at 1104.
55. Id. at 1105.
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A second and less talked about deficiency in Batson is the
harm done before a prima facie case can be made. A case for
racial use of peremptories cannot be reasonably built on one or
two minority strikes. The result is that a lawyer gets a few free
strikes against minority jurors before the prima facie case is
made.' These free strikes can in themselves remove a signifi-
cant percentage of minorities from the jury selection pool.
b. Post-Batson Evolution
In the wake of Batson, three cases began to shift the focus of
the Court's analysis to the right of potential jurors not to be
excluded on the basis of race. 7 The most recent decision, Geor-
gia v. McCollu, 5 s makes clear the potential juror's right not to
be struck on the basis of race.59 This shift has spawned many
extensions of the Batson principle. The defendant now need not
be the same race as the excluded juror to receive Batson analysis
of peremptory strikes.' Also, the distinction between the exclu-
sion ofjurors in a criminal and a civil proceeding has eroded,
61
and the Batson test has been extended to exclusions based on
gender.62 One commentator captured the new reach of the Bat-
son rule:
[The Court in] J.E.B. made the limits of Batson nearly
clear: peremptory challenges by any litigant in any pro-
ceeding can always be used to make any classification that
is subject to a "rational basis" test, such as occupation, but
they can never be used to strike jurors according to a "strict
scrutiny" classification, like race or national origin, or a
"heightened scrutiny" classification like gender.
63
The McCollum decision also extended Batson protection by
allowing the government to challenge peremptory strikes exer-
cised by the defense."
56. Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and theJuiy: VoirDire, Peremptoty
Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. Cii. L. REv. 153, 173 (1989).
57. See genera/ly Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992); Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400
(1991).
58. 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
59. Id. at 2357 (holding that even a defendant's racial use of peremptory
challenges violates the Equal Protection Clause).
60. Powers, 499 U.S. at 402.
61. Edmonson, 500 U.S. 614.
62. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
63. Ogletree supra note 39, at 1103 (interpreting the Court inJ.E.B., 511
U.S. at 1429).
64. Georgia v. McColum, 505 U.S. 42, 55 (1992).
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The reasoning behind protecting the rights of excluded
would-be jurors is sound. The effect, however, has been damag-
ing to the ideal of a fairly representative jury. In McCoUum,
"[t] he Court's focus on race-neutrality and the right ofjurors not
to be excluded on the basis of their race leave the Court but a
half-step from concluding that the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
hibits a defendant from striking jurors because they are white,
even in the interest of securing a racially mixed jury." Allowing
minority defendants to strike majority jurors "may be the only
chance that a minority defendant has to ensure that some minor-
ity jurors are included on the jury."'
In the end, the road that initially headed toward strengthen-
ing the Batson doctrine and promoting fairly representational
juries may have detoured. The new road may prove more consti-
tutionally sound but sacrifices the already frail protection of
minority representation. Conservative Justice Thomas oversimpli-
fied the effect of the Court's involvement in peremptory chal-
lenges by saying, "I am certain that black criminal defendants will
rue the day that this court ventured down the road" of restricting
peremptory challenges.67 This simplification misses the severely
disparate impact of racial peremptories on minorities and the
continuing need to protect minorities from their dangerous
power. While Justice Thomas may not be providing a good solu-
tion in recommending that the clock be rolled back to free use
of peremptory challenges, the fact remains that, for many rea-
sons, minority representation on juries remains dangerously
low.' In response, commentators have proposed a variety of
changes to the current system.
III. A SURVEY OF ALTERNATivES
The vast array of proposals can loosely be divided into those
that favor remedial reforms within the Batson system and those
that offer more radical deviations from current practice in search
of the diverse jury. The critiques of the various reform proposals
can also be loosely divided into two groups: critiques of a propo-
sal's efficacy in attaining mixed juries and constitutional critiques
65. Tanya Coke, Lady Justice May Be Blind, But Is She a Soul Sister?, 69
N.Y.U. L. Rxv. 327, 332 (1994).
66. Ramirez, supra note 20, at 804 (conceding that while allowing free
minority peremptory strikes of majority jurors may produce more mixed juries,
allowing these strikes is irreconcilable with a juror's right not to be excluded
because of race).
67. McCollum, 505 U.S. at 2259 (Thomas, J., concurring).
68. King, supra note 17, at 712.
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aimed specifically at proposals that favor race-conscious
remedies.
A. Problems of Race-Conscious Remedies
As the problems of Batson have become more clear, a whole
host of solutions have cropped up that take race into account at
various levels of the jury selection process in an attempt to pro-
duce proportional juries.69 While these proposals promise racial
representation, the overt use of racial classifications has
prompted several criticisms which merit some analysis. First, per-
haps race-conscious remedies are destructive, and as a matter of
policy they should be avoided. Second, the trend in Supreme
Court decisions raises serious doubts about the constitutional via-
bility of race-conscious remedies in any setting absent a strong
showing of necessity.7
1. Policy Criticisms of Race-Conscious Remedies
The allure of race-conscious remedies is obvious. It is easy
just to mandate that a certain percentage of every jury will be
African-American every time an African-American defendant
stands in a criminal trial and so on for Hispanics, Asiatics,
women, etc. Racial underrepresentation immediately vanishes;
race-conscious remedies, however, yield unintended side-effects.
First, race-conscious remedies require answering a difficult
question: "What groups get this special protection?" 1 The Court
itself has struggled with this question in the sense of beginning
with protecting racial groups72 and expanding to sex73 yet
remaining silent on religious groups.74 Even within the idea of
protecting against racially discriminatory peremptories, many dif-
ficult questions arise, chiefly: what is racial representation?
Should all non-whites be treated collectively as minorities? This
grouping leaves open strange possibilities of diversity. An all-
white and Korean jury constituting a "mixed jury" for an African-
American defendant would be "diverse" even though racial ani-
mosity could still cut against the defendant. Problems also arise
69. See infra section I, subsections B and C for comprehensive
representation of the landscape of proposals being offered.
70. SeeAdarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S.Ct. 2097 (1995); Shaw v.
Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
71. Alschuler, supra note 19, at 733-34.
72. Batson, 476 U.S. at 86.
73. JE.B., 114 S.Ct. at 1429.
74. The Court refused to hear a case on peremptory challenges based on
religious conviction. See Davis v. Minnesota, 114 S.Ct. 2120 (1994) (denying a
petition for writ of certiorari).
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when we discount other forms of discrimination beyond race.
Many other groups "feel aggrieved when no members of their
groups sit on the juries that resolve cases drawing their strong
interest and concern."7 5
.Second, while the intended effect of achieving racial repre-
sentation is to broaden the perspective of the jury and achieve
fairer verdicts, placing members of a group on a jury or jury list
on the basis of race may present a different effect. Minority
members may see their role as vindicating racial concerns. "If [an
affirmative action plan for jury selection] encouraged minority-
race jurors to view themselves not simply as independent citizens,
but as representative of a race or a people, that effect would be
regrettable."76 Placing jurors on a jury as a representative of
one's race may have the unintended effect of racially charging
every jury.
Finally, "[a] program grounded on the perception that the
members of different races have different viewpoints may make it
more likely that racially distinctive viewpoints will persist."77 The
ultimate solution to racial underrepresentation is the erosion of
the significance of race. We don't have this discussion about
Irish underrepresentation because scarcely anyone in the United
States cares whether someone is Irish or German. Race-con-
scious remedies, it is said, drive home racial differences and pro-
long the struggle for true equality. Additionally, race-conscious
solutions beg the difficult question of who is black, Hispanic, etc.
2. Race-Conscious Remedies and the Supreme Court
As a starting point, it should be noted that nothing in the
Constitution requires racially mixed juries. 78 The discussion will
always be on the allowability of race-conscious remedies. The
Court has made a gradual shift toward protecting the interest of
excluded jurors with the same vigor that earlier courts protected
minority defendants. 79 The effect of this shift has been in many
instances to reduce the ability of the Batson system to produce
racially mixed juries.
Race-conscious remedies do not appear to pose a direct vio-
lation of the Equal Protection Clause. Indeed, in this nation's
not too distant past, some jurisdictions required mixed juries in
75. Alschuler, supra note 19, at 735.
76. Id. at 737.
77. Id. at 741.
78. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 423 (1879) (stating that African-
Americans do not have "a right to have the jury composed in part of colored
men.").
79. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 409 (1991).
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certain circumstances. 80 The likely constitutional challenge is
that race-conscious remedies might trigger the higher review
standard of "strict scrutiny" under the Equal Protection Clause
requiring both a demonstration of a compelling state interest
and a showing that the remedy tailored poses the least burden
possible." The current arguments for avoiding strict scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause have been 1) that these reme-
dies "include" rather than "exclude" based on race and 2) that
these remedies do not deprive whites of any opportunities they
rightfully deserve.8" The weight of these arguments rested
squarely on a 1950 case, Cassell v. TexaPs in which a plurality
opinion failed to uphold a race-conscious jury selection process
because it amounted to a "purposeful, systematic non-inclusion
because of color."8
4
In Cassel, the Dallas county jury commissioner was placing
exactly one African-American on every grand jury. Justice Frank-
furter reasoned that when the commission limited the number of
African-American jurors, the commission was practicing "non-
inclusion" based on race and a violation the Equal Protection
Clause.'s The implication is that since race-conscious techniques
"include" minorities rather than "exclude" whites, they pose no
affront to the Fourteenth Amendment under Cassel 8 The dis-
tinction between inclusion and non-inclusion becomes tenuous
when dealing with a finite number of positions on a jury.87 With
twelve available spots, the inclusion of one person necessarily
involves the "non-inclusion" of another; however, this argument
seemed to carry the day.
The constitutional landscape has recently changed. The
court in three recent cases s moved beyond the reasoning in Gas-
selL "[A] ny distinction the Court once may have made between
racially inclusive and racially exclusive policies has vanished."'
The Court in Shaw set down a new analysis in which strict scrutiny
80. See Ramirez, supra note 20.
81. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993).
82. King, supra note 17, at 730.
83. 339 U.S. 282 (1950).
84. Id. at 291. (emphasis added).
85. I&
86. King, supra note 17, at 731 (referring particularly to Cassell v. Texas,
339 U.S. 282 (1950) as interpreted by Brooks v. Beto, 366 F.2d 1, 8-9 (5th Cir.
1966) in which Brooks upheld the inclusion of two African-Americans to a list of
16 prospective grand jurors).
87. King, supra note 17, at 732.
88. City of Richmond v. Croson, 448 U.S. 469 (1989); Georgia v.
McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
89. King, supra note 17, at 736.
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is triggered by the societal injury of government racial sorting
regardless of whether the government action includes or
excludes minorities.90 These decisions firmly entrench the court
in a posture of strict scrutiny for any government measure that
appears not to be color-blind,91 such that strict scrutiny applies
even when racial classifications burden or benefit the races
equally." The idea is that in the absence of searching judicial
inquiry, the court cannot distinguish between harmful and bene-
ficial racial classifying.9" The untested conclusion is that these
cases indicate that all race-conscious remedies will be met with
strict scrutiny, making race-conscious jury reform measures very
difficult regardless of whether they prove benign or harmful.
Another recent case may keep the window open for race-
conscious remedies. Gunther has long posited that subjecting a
process to strict scrutiny essentially means the process will
be found constitutionally wanting.94 The Supreme Court in
Adarand softened this definition of strict scrutiny, maintaining
strict scrutiny need not be fatal in fact.95 Additionally, jury selec-
tion may merit special treatment because "U]uries are distinctive
both because affirmative action in jury selection has special vir-
tues and because it is likely to prove less costly to individuals and
society than affirmative action in other contexts."96 In meeting
the rigors of strict scrutiny, states could provide strong evidence
of "past or continuing intentional racial discrimination during
90. Id. at 739 (referring to Shaw, 113 S.Ct. at 2824-28, which overlooked
the benefits of proportional representation by congressional district racial
gerrymandering instead focusing on the harms of reinforcing stereotypes and
enflaming racial partisanship).
91. Id. at 741.
92. Powers, 499 U.S. at 410.
93. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
94. Gerald Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972)(writing that
heightened scrutiny is "'strict' in theory and fatal in fact").
95. Adarand, 115 S.Ct. at 2097.
96. Alschuler, supra note 19, at 718-22 (Demonstrating the peculiarity of
jury selection affirmative action as opposed to other affirmative action settings,
Alschuler notes the lack of harm imposed by affirmative action injury selection
in that losing a seat on a jury as a majority member is not nearly as painful as
losing a job or some other merit based position. This argument seems to miss
that this controversy initially erupted because minorities were being excluded
not from jobs but from jury service. Alschuler goes on to demonstrate that jury
selection programs would not engender the stigmatization that can often be the
result of affirmative action in for example the workplace. No juror placed on a
jury will feel inferior because of the mode of her arriving on the jury. Given the
benefits of a mixed jury and the minimized harms of the jury selection setting,
Alschuler concludes that the Court could approve affirmative steps in this
setting even with strict scrutiny.).
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the jury selection process.""' The Court has consistently found
the correction of this kind of abuse to constitute a compelling
interest.98 Another possible avenue is a claim that the goal of
producing a fairly representational venire is a compelling inter-
est.' The second requirement of strict scrutiny requiring that
the remedy is reasonably necessary to achieve the compelling
interest will probably require an exhaustion of any practically
available race-neutral solutions. °'0 Though difficult, strict scru-
tiny is not the death knell it was once thought to be.
B. Reforms Within Batson
If the problem of racial underrepresentation on juries under
the Batson system could be cured with a little "tinkering," such
reforms would be safer than bold new plans striking out into
uncharted territory. Reform within the Batson system could sig-
nificantly affect the ultimate make-up of juries and temper the
problem of minority underrepresentation. Batson proposals can
loosely be separated into two groups: those that sidestep Batson
issues either by moving the trial to more racially balanced areas
and those that increase the representation of minorities in the
venire, theoretically raising the probability of racial representa-
tion on the petit jury.
1. Race-Conscious Change of Venue Statutes
The Rodney King case vividly illustrated the dangers of
transferring a case from a racially mixed community to a primar-
ily white community.10 Statistically fewer minorities will be on
the jury than if the trial had proceeded in the original jurisdic-
tion. While this problem does not flow from racial use of per-
emptory challenges, the effect of reducing the minority
percentage in the pool from which the venire is chosen does
make the racial use of peremptories more potent. If fewer
minorities are in the venire, they are easier to remove, especially
considering that the prosecutor may get two free strikes before a
prima facie case of a Batson violation can be made.
97. King, supra note 17, at 745.
98. Croson, 488 U.S. at 498-507.
99. King, supra note 17, at 747 (King goes on to mention the abstract
aims of fairness, appearance and broad participation in the jury process as
potentially compelling interests). Id. at 751.
100. Id. at 753.
101. Thomas C. Palmer, Jr., Amnesia on Victim's Rights, Did Moving the King
Trial to Ventura County Harm the Accuser's Inteets?, BOSTON GLOBE, May 3, 1992.
(writing of a rising "death toll" in the "spasms of violence that have trailed
[King's] verdict").
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In circumstances where a suspect class for equal protection
analysis would probably suffer a significant reduction in repre-
sentation in the venire because of the change in venue, the court
should be obliged to make proportional racial presence a factor
in evaluating the potential jurisdictions for the trial.10 2
2. Revised Jury Lists
Section II of this note highlighted the consistent under-
representation of minorities at every stage of the jury selection
process. If minorities were proportionally represented in a
venire, they would have a better chance of surviving the voir dire
process even as it stands today. First, if a prosecutor is dead set
on using her peremptories to try to remove minorities, she will
have a tougher time if more minorities are present in the venire.
Second, even if the prosecutor does not use peremptories
racially, the presence of more minorities will obviously raise the
probability of proportional representation or at least some
minority presence. Addressing the minority exclusion problem
at this stage also offers several distinct benefits. "[T]he
demographics of particular jurisdictions may make it easier to
achieve racial balance in large groups than in small groups." 05
There is no way for a petit jury of twelve to reflect, for example,
twenty distinct groups. Also, measures taken at the jury pool for-
mation stage, even race-conscious measures, seem to generate
less public concern than direct quotas on the makeup of
juries.1°4
The strongest critique of measures which focus on the
venire pool is that they do not assure proportional representa-
tion on petit juries. A commission aimed at achieving propor-
tional representation of minorities in Hennepin County,
102. M. Shanara Gilbert, An Ounce of Prevention: A Constitutional
Prescription for Choice of Venue in Racially Sensitive Criminal Cases, 67 TuL. L. REv.
1855, 1935-42 (1993) (Professor Gilbert concedes that the current test for
equal protection violations requires showing of intentional discrimination, a
task near impossible to prove against a trial court judge presiding over a change
of venue motion. Conversely, the Sixth Amendment is read as requiring only a
showing that the venire represent a "fair cross-section." Professor Gilbert
proposes that courts split the difference between the hard burden of equal
protection and the relatively soft burden of the fair cross-section requirement.
Her proposal built either on federal legislation, a broader court reading of
equal protection provisions or state legislation would strengthen appellate
review of trial court's decisions in change of venue situations. The thrust of the
change would be to treat a failure to take race into account in deciding change
of venue as a rebuttable presumption of an equal protection violation.).
103. Alschuler, supra note 19, at 712.
104. Id. at 713.
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Minnesota, ran into this problem. Hennepin County wanted to
achieve proportional representation on their grand juries. Hen-
nepin County officials ultimately concluded that protecting the
venire does not ensure racial representation, finding for example
that "[t] he random selection of 23 grand jurors from a large pool
engineered to ensure 10% minority group membership would
yield all-white grand juries 9% of the time." " This result would
be magnified in trying to seat a proportional petit jury both in
that the larger size of a grand jury lowers the odds of no minority
representation"6 and in that the 10% minority presence in the
jury pool would have to endure a racially-charged voir dire pro-
cess.1°7 The commission ultimately proposed a quota system
which would ensure minority representation on every grand
jury." 8 While proposals protecting racial presence in the venire
would help the situation, their ultimate efficacy in producing
mixed juries remains very much in doubt.
a. Drawing from More Inclusive Sources
Currently, the federal process for selecting the venire is gov-
erned by statutes providing that federal jury source lists be drawn
from voter registration rolls unless they prove to substantially
underrepresent certain groups, in which case the court can use
other sources to correct the deficiency."° Accepting the conclu-
sion that minorities are greatly underrepresented at this early
stage,110 correcting the problem of underrepresentative source
lists is the easiest solution. If voter registration lists are inade-
quate, add food stamp lists or driver's license lists checking the
lists from time to time to ensure racial proportionality.' These
easy remedies would go a long way toward tempering the dispro-
portionality of juries even if completely proportional lists would
not cure the disease." 2 These easiest remedies should precede
all others.
105. Id. at 713 n.42.
106. By example, if the jury consisted of 1000 and were drawn from a
pool that contained 10% minority, random drawing would almost never
produce a jury containing no minorities.
107. The grand jury in Minnesota did not undergo extensive voir dire.
108. See Smith, supra note 32.
109. The Federal Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-
274, 82 Stat. 53, 28 U.S.C. secs. 1861-78 (1988).
110. See King, supra note 17, at 712.
111. Some jurisdictions are aggressively maintaining racially proportional
jury lists; See generally, King, supra note 17, at nn.45-47.
112. Id. at 721-22.
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b. Affirmative Action in Jury Lists
Other proposals take the stronger approach of affirmative
steps to ensure proportional representation on jury lists. Each
proposal is subject to the constitutional dangers mentioned
above; however, "departures from the principle of color blind-
ness may be less visible when they occur early in the jury selection
process."113 At any rate, each leaves nothing to chance in pro-
ducing a representational mix of prospective jurors.
One way to ensure representation in the venire is to divide
the general list into race-based groups. If, for example, 20% Afri-
can-American representation is sought in a venire of thirty pro-
spective jurors, twenty-four jurors would be drawn from the
majority pool and six would be drawn from the African-American
pool. A bar committee in Arizona has proposed just such a pro-
cess." 4 Similarly, in DeKalb County, Georgia, a computer assists
in the process by dividing the total jury pool into thirty-six demo-
graphic categories and drawing from these groups so that on bal-
ance every group is fairly represented." 5
Another technique, oversampling, involves drawing more
potential jurors from demographic areas that contain higher per-
centages of minorities. For example, African-Americans consti-
tute 19% of the Detroit unit of the Eastern Federal District of
Michigan, yet current jury selection techniques consistently yield
venires of only 14% African-Americans. As a remedial measure
the court sends more jury questionnaires to areas that are 65% or
more African-American until the list reflects the numbers found
in the community at large." 6 In yet another approach, some Ari-
zona trial judges exercise veto power over juries that contain too
few minority jurors." 7 Similar powers could be used over jury
lists or venires that do not reflect the community.
Any of these proposals would effectively cure under-
representation in the venire, but while these solutions might
increase the probability of a proportional jury, "[t]here are
stronger remedies available, directed more specifically at the dis-
criminatory use of peremptory strikes, which could give Batson
more practical effect."118
113. Alschuler, supra note 19, at 712.
114. SeeJeff Barge, Reformers TargetJury Lists, A.BA.. Jan., 1995, at 26.
115. Alschuler, supra note 19, at 711.
116. King, supra note 17, at 722-23.
117. Barge, supra note 114, at 26.
118. Ogletree, supra note 39, at 1116.
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3. Giving More "Teeth" to Batson
Several commentators believe that the problem in the Batson
system can be corrected by fine-tuning the Batson procedure.
These remedies come in two varieties: 1) punitive measures for
litigants who try to exercise improper challenges, and 2) preven-
tive changes in the process designed to catch or thwart improper
challenges.
Currently, the only remedy for a Batson violation is to call for
a new jury.119 The problem with this remedy is that the attorney
is no worse off for having tried to exercise her peremptories
improperly.12 ° Several proposals have been made that would
stiffen the penalty for parties who are found to have used their
peremptories improperly. The idea is to make the racial use of
peremptories more "costly" and thus a less attractive option to
attorneys.
One option is to reseat the excluded juror.12' The risk of
having a juror whom the attorney just struck reseated when the
attorney's misuse of peremptories is detected should provide
enough disincentive to keep most attorneys from attempting
improper use. The cost would be too high if the attorney gets
caught. A milder form of disincentive would be to reduce attor-
ney's peremptories as a penalty for improper strikes.122 Simi-
larly, the court could also use sanctions to punish habitual
offenders. 23 When a Batson violation is detected, courts could
dismiss the case and not allow it to be brought again. 124 Much as
courts use the exclusionary rule as a prophylactic measure
against police misconduct, the strong measure of dismissal with
prejudice would make any attempt at racial use of peremptories
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. (This proposal was offered by Cynthia Richers-Rowland, Batson v.
Kentucky: The New and Improved Peremptory Challenge, 38 HAsTINGS LJ. 1195, 1221
(1987).
122. Ogletree, supra note 39, at 1116; for more thorough treatment see
David Hopper, Batson v. Kentucky and the Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenge:
Arbitrary and Capricious Equal Potection?, 74 VA. L. REv. 811, 837 (1988).
123. Ogletree, supra note 39, at 1117; for a proposed ABA rule making
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges and rules of ethics violation, see
Andrew Gordon, Beyond Batson v. Kentucky: A Proposed Ethical Rule Prohibiting
Racial Discrimination injury Seketion, 62 Fo.DHAM L. REv. 685 (1993).
124. Id. at 1117 (Professor Ogletree uses the rationale behind the
exclusionary rule and dismissal for prosecutorial misconduct to claim the need
for such a strong remedy, a remedy well within the appellate courts' supervisory
power).
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foolish. Alternatively, as a direct measure against the attorney
involved, courts could impose disciplinary actions.1" 5
Courts, however, are not hurrying to implement these sug-
gestions. Perhaps the specter of releasing criminals because the
prosecutor blundered makes these suggestions too extreme; how-
ever they do present novel methods of altering the calculus that
attorneys, as rational economic actors, employ. Economically
adjusting the inducements to racially use peremptories could go
a long way toward achieving mixed juries; however, the problems
associated with catching a Batson violation would persist.
4. Changing the Process to Deter Racial Peremptories
Some suggest that the problem lies in the Batson procedure.
Commentators have proposed both modest reforms aimed at
tweaking the process and some more extensive changes. Legisla-
tors , for example, could impose statutory limits on the type of
acceptable race-neutral explanations offered to defend a Batson
challenge126 or courts could grant closer scrutiny for certain
types of reasons. 12 7 Similarly, expanded voir dire could help the
process become more effective 12in providing a more developed
record necessary to point out when attorneys are using their per-
emptories improperly."2 More dramatically, commentators have
proposed various tests which could substitute for the current test
imposed for Batson violations.13 0
125. Id. at 1122 (mentioning several possibilities including contempt,
censure or reprimand, removal from the courtroom, suspension of the right to
practice in that court, referral to a disciplinary body, identification and
admonition in published judicial opinions).
126. Id. at 1123-24 (For example, courts could disallow reasoning based
on soft data such as demeanor, intuition, impressions, etc.; courts could also be
sensitive to explanations that are proxies for race such as location of residence,
etc.).
127. Id. at 1124 (According to Ogletree, this approach used in North
Carolina applies closer scrutiny for 1) reasons that appear to be substitutes for
racial hostility or apply more often to racial minorities, 2) reasons that apply
equally to white jurors whom the prosecutor did not strike, and 3) vague or
subjective reasons).
128. More information would reduce the tendency to rely on racial
stereotypes.
129. Ogletree, supra note 39, at 1126; see alsoJ.E.B. v. Alabama, 114 S.Ct.
1419, 1429 (1994).
130. Ogletree, supra note 39, at 1123-24; see also Brian J. Serr & Mak
Maney, Racism, Peremptory Challenges, and the Democratic Juy: TheJunspnuence of a
Delicate Balance, 79 J. Cram. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 64 (1988) (Serr and Maney
propose a three part test. First, requiring a specific explanation, second,
requiring that the prosecutor's explanation be rationally related to juror bias,
third requiring the explanation be made in good faith.). See also, J. Swift, Note,
Batson's Invidious Legacy: DiscriminatoryJuror Exclusion and the 'Intuitive' Peremptory
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C. Reforming Beyond Status Quo
"While [race-conscious mechanisms for ensuring minority
representation] address many of the factors in the jury selection
system that contribute to the underrepresentation of minorities
in jury venires, they fail to influence directly one of the most
troublesome factors which affects underrepresentation in the
petit jury - the use of peremptory strikes in a racially discrimina-
tory manner...."13 1 The Miranda Court provided some justifica-
tion for looking for new solutions to the underrepresentation
problem when it wrote:
It is impossible for us to foresee the potential alternatives
for protecting the privilege which might be devised by
Congress or the States in the exercise of their creative rule-
making capacities. Therefore we cannot say that the Con-
stitution necessarily requires adherence to any particular
solution for the inherent compulsions of the interrogation
process as it is presently conducted. Our decision in no
way creates a constitutional straijacket which will handicap
sound efforts at reform, nor is it intended to have this
effect. We encourage Congress and the States to continue
their laudable search for increasingly effective ways of pro-
tecting the rights of the individual while promoting effi-
dent enforcement of our criminal laws. However, unless
we are shown other procedures which are at least as effec-
tive in apprising accused persons of their right of silence
and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the
following safeguards must be observed.
1 32
Perhaps this reasoning should apply to addressing the Batson
problem as well.
1. Dropping Peremptories Altogether
The easiest way to solve the problem of racial use of per-
emptories is to drop peremptories altogether. Abolishing per-
emptories is not a drastic step from where we are now.'33 We
Cha/lenge, 78 CovNixu. L. REv. 336, 361-62 (1993) (another new three-part test
requiring: 1) that courts applying Batson require hard data explanations, 2)
explanations be based solely on juror's written or oral statements during voir
dire, and 3) to strike one juror, the "attorneys should be required to strike all
jurors with the same 'unacceptable' characteristic, regardless of race").
131. Ogletree, supra note 39, at 1115-16.
132. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
133. Ogletree, supra note 39, at 1131-32 (arguing that requiring an
explanation of a peremptory challenge already destroys the purported function
of a peremptory - "to allow parties to express hunches, intuitions, and
admittedly arbitrary preferences").
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currently require explanations for many peremptory challenges
directed at minority defendants. Strictly speaking, the peremp-
tory challenge is gone for those challenges. We essentially only
allow for-cause removal of minority potential jurors. The Court
in J.E.B., however, flatly denies any intention to abolish peremp-
tory challenges. 1" Supporters of peremptories praise the per-
emptory's ability to remove biased jurors, but question whether
attorneys have enough information on jurors to identify the
biased jurors. In the absence of useful information, attorneys
must rely on mere prejudice or unsupported "gut feeling." The
benefit of honoring unsubstantiated feelings is difficult to dis-
cern; however, commentators have indicated that in marginal
cases the complete removal of peremptories might yield unjust
convictions suggesting that while peremptories can be used to
yield unfair results, their absence poses a serious risk as well.'
2. Strict Quotas and the Jury De Medietate Linguae
The most direct method of curing minority under-
representation on the petit jury is to insist on a certain number
of minority jurors on every jury. The specter of quotas triggers
alarms for some, but "the use of quotas to select juries seems no
more objectionable than the use of quotas to select jury
pools.""s While quotas are vulnerable to the constitutional
attacks discussed above, their use is not new.
Before the Fourteenth century the British used a special jury
called the jury de medietate linguae (or jury of the half tongue).'I
Special charters promised Jews that if they were drawn to court
by an Englishmen, their jury would be one-half Jewish and one-
half English.13 8 After the Jews were banished from England in
134. J.E.B., 114 S.Ct. at 1429 ("Our conclusion that litigants may not
strike potential jurors solely on the basis of gender does not imply the
elimination of all peremptory challenges. Neither does it conflict with a State's
legitimate interest in using such challenges in its effort to secure a fair and
impartial jury. Parties still may remove jurors whom they feel might be less
acceptable than others on the panel; gender simply may not serve as a proxy for
bias. Parties may also exercise their peremptory challenges to remove from the
venire any group or class of individuals normally subject to 'rational basis'
review.").
135. See generally Hans Zeisel & Shari Seidman Diamond, The Effect of
Peremptory CAallenges on jury and Verdict: An Experiment in a Federal District Cou
30 STAN. L. Rlv. 491, 529 (1978); Ogletree, supra note 39, at 1146.
136. Alschuler, supra note 19, at 713.
137. Daniel W. Van Ness, Preserving a Community Voic: The Case for Half-
and-HalfJuries in Racially-Charged Criminal Cases, 28J. MARSHALL L. Rv. 1, 5 n.18
(1994).
138. Ramirez, supra note 20, at 784.
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the summer of 1290, the practice of the jury de medietate linguae
was extended to alien merchants in their conflicts with English-
men.1 9 The value of the mixed jury to alien merchants is best
illustrated by their response when the jury de medietate linguae was
taken away in 1414. When foreign merchants responded by
refusing to do business in England,"4 English courts promptly
reinstituted the right to a mixed jury in 1429, and the right con-
tinued in England until 1554. The mixed jury lasted until 1951
in some of the British colonies serving to protect British citizens
of European dissent. 4'
In the United States the jury de medietate linguae was used
both before and after independence, 42 although not uni-
formly,143 and less frequently over time."' On a few occasions a
quota system has been used to impanel African-Americans.' 45
For example, in the treason trial of Jefferson Davis following the
Civil War, a jury intentionally one-half African-American was
impaneled but not used as the case was ultimately dismissed.' 4
Furthermore, some states, such as South Carolina in the late
1800s, required proportional representation of African-Ameri-
cans, but the practice dwindled.' 47 Ultimately, U.S. courts
deemed the jury de medietate linguae to be a right that no longer
applied."4
a. Various Proposals
One plan proposes requiring three jurors "racially similar"
to the defendant out of a jury of twelve.' 49 The author of this
plan notes that one dissenting juror virtually never succeeds
against eleven opposing jurors.) °  "[A] race neutral verdict is
achieved when at least three black jurors are selected to judge a
139. Id. at 785.
140. Id. at 786.
141. Id at 786-88.
142. Van Ness, supra note 137, at 42.
143. Id. at 42-43.
144. Id. at 43.
145. Alschuler, supra note 19, at n.49.
146. Id. at 715 (These were the first African-Americans to serve on any
American jury prior to 1860).
147. Id
148. See United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123 (1936) ("Although aliens are
within the protection of the Sixth Amendment, the ancient rule under which
an alien might have a trial by jury de medietate linguae... no longer obtains."
I& at 185).
149. Johnson, supra note 3, at 1698-99.
150. Id. at 1698 (for further research on the limited effect of one
dissenting juror, seeJohnson, supra note 3, at n.466).
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criminal or civil case that involves the rights of a black person."'51
Three of twelve "racially similar" jurors is the compromise
between the harm of having one or no racially similar jurors and
the impracticability of obtaining a jury evenly balanced along
racial lines.'1
2
Others would concede that fairness requires that affirmative
efforts to protect both minority defendants and jurors should be
bounded numerically by that group's proportional representa-
tion in the community at large. Implementation of proportional
representation could take various forms, including adjusting voir
dire when seating another majority member would encroach on
the proportional representation of the defendant's race.1 55 In
England, from 1980-1989, judges could hold potential jurors as
"stand-by" jurors to replace majority members creating a racially
mixed jury." This British stand-aside model could be imple-
mented to assure proportional representation or whatever level
of representation is deemed appropriate.
b. Hennepin County Model
One very aggressive program has been proposed by the
county commission in Hennepin County, Minnesota. After a
detailed analysis of the problem of minority underrepresentation
in their county, they recommended among other things155 a
modification of their current grand jury selection process to
ensure that minority representation on grand juries mirrors
minority proportions in the county.'5 6 The process they pro-
posed to seat a mixed twenty-three person grand jury has two
phases. In the first phase, twenty-one jurors are randomly
selected from the source list.' 57 The second phase depends on
the outcome of the first selection. If less than two of the twenty-
one are minorities, selection continues down the list randomly
151. Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth Amendment as
a Prohibition Against the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenge, 76 CoRNELL L. REv. 1,
124 (1990).
152. Johnson, supra note 3, at 1698-99. For a proposal to require a full
50% racially similar jurors, see DEIuCK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM AND
AMRIcAN LAw 273-74 (1980).
153. See generaly Note, The Case for Black Juries, 79 YALE L.J. 531, 548
(1970); Charles J. Ogletree, Just Say No!: A Proposal to Eliminate RaciaUy
Discriminatory Uses of Peremptory Challenges, 31 AM. Cum. L. REv. 1099 (1994).
154. Ramirez, supra note 20, at 802-03.
155. For example, more modest reforms such as expanded source lists to
increase minority representation in the grand jury pool.
156. Louis N. Smith, Final Report of the Hennepin County Attorney's Task Force
on Racial Composition of the GrandJuyy, 16 HAmUNE L. REv. 879, 909-15 (1993).
157. No voir dire accompanies the selection of grand juries.
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until at least two of the twenty-three are minorities. 1 s If two or
more of the first twenty-one jurors are minorities, then the next
two names on the list complete the twenty-three person grand
jury. This process will always yield at least a 9% minority grand
jury, mirroring the minority percentage in Hennepin County.
The commission cited a precedent for this program in Geor-
gia where the proportion of minorities cannot differ from minor-
ity presence in the community by more than 5%.159 This,
however, is the first seriously contemplated program which
would require exact proportionality on thejury. If implemented,
constitutional challenges will probably accompany this plan, and
passing strict scrutiny will prove no easy task. Also, instead of
delving into the difficult question of which groups to protect, the
commission instead merely lumped all minorities together, a
choice that will certainly meet with considerable controversy.
While as yet still unenacted, the Hennepin County model
remains the strongest affirmative action plan being considered.
3. Half-and-Half Juries
The changing of venue from areas of high minority pres-
ence to areas of low minority presence is a major source of at
least perceived discrimination." The community voice aspect
of the jury is important to maintain the perception of credibil-
ity161 and ajust outcome.1 62 When a change of venue is required
for a fair trial, the court is caught between the Sixth Amend-
ment's impartial jury requirement and its requirement that the
jury come from the district of the crime (the vicinage require-
ment). " Again tracking the historic jury de medietate linguae, one
proposal allows the judge to require that the jury be made up of
jurors one-half from new venue and one-half from the district
where the crime occurred.' This proposal illustrates a modem
application of the jury de medietate linguae.
158. Smith, supra note 156, at 909.
159. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF GEORGIA, ADmiNIsTRATrVE OFFICE OF THE
COURTs, JURY CommSSioNERs HANDBOOK 19 (June 19, 1990).
160. Van Ness, supra note 137, at 3 (citing the move to Simi Valley in the
Rodney King beating case).
161. Id. at 47-49.
162. Id. at 49-53 (arguing that a higher degree ofjustice is produced by a
group with an understanding of the community norms and practices).
163. Id. at 46.




The idea of affirmative selection was first proposed in a stu-
dent note written in 19861'just before the Court swept through
the Batson reforms. Following for-cause voir dire, both sides
under this proposal would choose their ideal jury from the quali-
fied venire and rank their choices. From these lists the judge
would first select every potential juror who appeared on both
lists. After that, the judge would start at the top of each list tak-
ing the first selection from each list then the second selection
from each list until enough jurors were selected."
The beauty of affirmative selection is that any party can pro-
tect whatever interest she deems to be important. If race is
important to a party, then racial representation is easy to achieve.
If religious representation is important to the party, then the
attorney can make selections based on juror religious beliefs.
Whatever is important to the party can become the basis of selec-
tion. Unlike race-conscious solutions, the state need never be
drawn into the complicated question of whom to protect and
why. Each party has the power to protect its own interests. Fur-
thermore, this method, in not affording either side the power to
exclude any venireperson, should reduce the equal protection
concern over discriminatory exclusions of particular jurors1 6 7
because no party could exclude anyone.
Several criticisms can be leveled against affirmative selection
models. "[T] he parties' ability to strike jurors offended [by the
attorney] during a probing voir dire" is lost."t An attorney may
then be leery of asking probing questions because if she offends
the prospective juror the other side may very well add that juror
to their affirmative list.
The most serious criticism of affirmative selection is that it
creates a tendency toward a polarized jury."6 With perfect attor-
ney knowledge, peremptory challenges would drop off the
extreme members of a group. Unfortunately, with perfect knowl-
edge, pure affirmative selection would select primarily the most
biased individuals from the array. The result would likely be a
dramatic increase in hung juries; however, negative peremptories
might produce juries no less extreme. Attorneys lack a strong
ability to spot idiosyncrasies in prospective jurors; so the polariz-
165. Tracy Altman, Note, Affimative Selction: A New R mponse to Permptoy
Challenge Abuse 38 STAN. L. REv. 781 (1986).
166. Id.
167. Coke, supra, note 65, at 380.
168. Altman, supra note 165, at 808.
169. Id. at 809.
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ing tendency might not occur to any significant degree.17 Even
granting a higher probability of hung juries, this process of pro-
ducing more diverse juries is more in line with the Sixth Amend-
ment's right to a fair cross-section than current methods.1
7'
Voir dire will remove most of the fringe elements for cause.
If any attorney cannot demonstrate that a potential juror is
biased, any opinion that the juror is biased must be an "unsub-
stantiated intuition of partiality" which has been shown to be a
very inaccurate appraisal of potential jurors' extreme disposi-
tions." "Defenses of the current system almost certainly exag-
gerate lawyers' ability to spot 'ringers,' and overinvest in the
notion of a perfectly impartial juror."73 Furthermore, as Batson
has been extended to other forms of discrimination, such as
sex,17 4 the use of peremptories as a means of removing biased
jurors has steadily diminished. 75
a. Jury De Medietate Linguae
One novel approach presents a strikingly new way to achieve
a mixedjury.176 This method "provide[s] each litigant with a cer-
tain number of affirmative peremptory choices, which litigants
could use."' 77 The process for selection runs through three
phases.
In phase one the qualified venire is selected using tradi-
tional methods of jury lists.' 78 In phase two the qualified venire
is whittled down to a "relevant qualified venire" using traditional
voir dire to remove for cause any unfit potential jurors. Then
each party affirmatively selects a fixed number ofjurors from the
qualified venire. The number of selections equals their number
of peremptory challenges (e.g. five). These selections can be for
any reason including racial bias. In addition to the affirmative
selections by each party, the court randomly selects jurors equal
to the number to be seated. At this point there are twenty-two
potential jurors (vis., five selections by each party and twelve ran-
dom selections by the court). Neither the parties' choices nor
the court's choices are disclosed. In phase three, both sides exer-
170. Id. at 810.
171. Id.
172. Hans Ziesel, Affimative Peremptoy Juror Sdectio 39 STAN. L.REV. 1165
(1987).
173. Coke, supra note 65, at 382.
174. SeJ.E.B. v Alabama, 511 U.S. 1419 (1994).
175. Coke, supra note 65, at 383.
176. Ramirez, supra note 20, at 783-97.
177. Id. at 806.
178. Id. at 807.
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cise their peremptory challenges subject to Batson analysis reduc-
ing the pool down to the number needed for the jury.179
Under this process any party can significantly raise the
probability of a mixed jury by affirmatively placing more of a
given group on the relevant qualified venire. The final exercise
of peremptories would still be shielded by Batson analysis pre-
cluding racial use of peremptories; a litigant could, however, use
her affirmative selections to increase the likelihood of a mixed
jury. 180
This process should reduce both the possibility of a given
juror feeling like a racial representative and the inducement to
vote along racial lines because no juror would know whether she
was seated as a result of affirmative selection or random forces.""1
Also reduced is the balkanization that accompanies race-con-
scious remedies. This balkanization comes in large measure
from determining which groups can claim some prejudice and
merit protection, a question never asked in this plan. Instead,
litigants are allowed to consider race as only one of many criteria
in forming a jury.
1 82
This selection process also enhances appearance of fairness
brought byr the measure of litigant control introduced by this
proposal, yet it avoids criticism by excluded majority members
in that the Batson process still applies1a4 as opposed to pure quo-
tas such as the Hennepin County model.
The shortcomings of this plan include a continued reliance
on the Batson process to preclude racial peremptories even
though the insertion of more minorities will theoretically raise
the probability of mixedjuries. A better application of the jury de
medietate linguae would avoid such reliance on the ailing Batson
process.
IV. A NEW SOLUTION
A great strength of our form of government is the opportu-
nity to try different approaches to solving complicated problems.
As Justice Brandeis wrote: "It is one of the happy incidents of the
federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens
179. I&
180. Id. at 809.
181. Id. at 810.
182. Id. at 811-13.
183. Id. at 813.
184. Id. at 814.
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choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country."'"
In that spirit of trying bold ideas, I propose a new method of
selecting juries.
A. The Building Blocks of Reform
The proposals on the table now, to varying degrees, could
produce more representational juries. Most of the proposals
encountered criticisms along fairly consistent lines. Affirmative
action plans might prove constitutionally infirm or produce
other unwanted side effects. Softer approaches fail to provide
enough assurance of producing proportional juries. A better
plan would avoid these pitfalls.
First, the several solutions focusing on the process before
voir dire leave some gaping problems. While a procedure which
underrepresents minorities in the venire will like yield dispropor-
tionally few minorities on juries, the discrimination that even a
proportional venire will face in voir dire still leaves a specter of
consistent underrepresentation. This is to say nothing of the sta-
tistical probabilities that, in the absence of discrimination in voir
dire, a minority group still faces a fairly strong possibility of being
completely excluded from any given jury." "[Providing that
only the initial pool need reflect [racial] balance would seem a
hesitant and ineffective way of making juries more representa-
tive. Exorcising the specter of the all-white jury altogether would
appear more sensible." 18 7 In formulating a proposal, I endeavor
to do more than cure the evils of pre-voir dire selection.
Racial sorting is a second dangerous aspect which the race-
conscious proposals embrace. Racial sorting carries several draw-
backs. First any race-conscious plan immediately presents the
question of what groups should be protected. The determina-
tion to protect one group such as racial minorities from discrimi-
nation and not to protect another group such as a religious
groups involve drawing lines which are difficult to defend. Also,
contrary to the goal of a color-blind society, racial sorting reaf-
firms the differences between racial groups and perhaps more
significantly showcases the presence of racial stereotypes.
Implicit in saying that a prosecutor cannot strike African-Ameri-
185. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting).
186. Left purely to chance with no discrimination, a minority presence of
10% in a community will find themselves completely excluded from a jury of 12
on 28% of the juries produced by my process.
187. Alschuler, supra note 19, at 713.
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cans without a good reason is the statement that she would if she
could. Reaffirming racial distinctions is a hidden price of race-
conscious remedies in general.
Beyond the societal toll of the affirmative action type plans,
section II(A) (2) above discussed the possible constitutional diffi-
culty many affirmative action plans could encounter. "For the
Court, the societal injury created by the government's use of race
to design juries - even without discernible effects on the oppor-
tunities of individuals or groups - is probably sufficient to trig-
ger close scrutiny. " "8s If a plan can be designed which would
significantly promote racial representation without relying on
racial sorting, such constitutional rigors could be avoided.
The last building block for this proposal draws on a concept
very familiar to the jury selection process, yet one not greatly uti-
lized or discussed, randomness. Unfortunately, relying on the
fickle "gods of Fate, Luck, and Statistics"" can still yield grossly
underrepresentative juries. This new proposal to some degree
tames these gods in a way that allows them to produce fairness
both actual and perceived yet tempers them from harsh, unac-
ceptable outcomes.
B. Modifid Lottery: A Proposal
The process for a modified lottery is essentially a form of
cumulative voting. First, a qualified venire is selected using
whatever source lists are appropriate. From this list the parties
conduct for-cause voir dire removing any unsuitable candidates
until a group of thirty-six potential jurors is reached.
From this group of thirty-six potential jurors, a twelve mem-
ber jury will be selected by lottery. First, the court assigns a lot-
tery "ticket" for every potential juror, ensuring that every
potential juror who survives for-cause voir dire has an irremova-
ble chance of sitting on the jury. In addition, each side receives
twenty-four tickets which can be assigned in any manner, for
whatever reason, such that a litigant can cast all twenty-four for
one potential juror or spread them out in any manner desired.
From this pool of eighty-four tickets (vis., 36+24+24), the judge
randomly draws until twelve jurors are selected.
Each party will have the ammunition to protect whatever
interest is important to that litigant, but at an "economic" price.
If race is important to a litigant then she can cast her twenty-four
votes for minorities and significantly raise the probability of their
sitting on the jury. The price for casting all of the votes for say
188. King, supra note 17, at 739.
189. Alschuler, supra note 19, at 714.
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three potential jurors is to turn more of the control of the jury
over to one's opponent, albeit tempered by the random force of
the tickets cast for every potential juror by the court.
In carrying the various constitutional burdens, this plan
should perform adequately. Potential jurors should not have any
equal protection claims because no one can be excluded in the
sense that every potential juror will always have at least a one in
eighty-four chance of sitting on the jury. The Court's own test
turned on racial sorting as the trigger for strict scrutiny, 9 ' and
no racial sorting is done in this process. Furthermore, defend-
ants should not be able to complain about underrepresentation
of their particular group because they can raise the probability of
that group's inclusion by casting their tickets for members of that
group.
The whole basket of difficulties brought on by a process
which segments of the public perceive to be unfair would be
avoided. The element of chance adds to legitimacy' 9 and the
power that each party holds to manipulate chance affirmatively
in their favor should remove any lingering doubts about unfair-
ness in the process.
The strongest practical critique (as in all affirmative selec-
tion models) is the question of hung juries. The affirmative
selection models listed above all encountered claims that their
processes would yield more hung juries since the jury would con-
tain more fringe elements. In response, each of the other affirm-
ative selection models above saw the hung jury problem as
overstated. If a prosecutor cannot convince a mixed jury then
there should probably not be a conviction. To the extent there is
a hung jury problem, it will be tempered by the fact that all of the
potential jurors will have at least one ticket in the hat, raising the
probability that the final jury will not be made up of the most
extreme members of the pool.
C. A Model Statute
The U.S. Code implements the current scheme ofjury selec-
tion by making a general statement of jury selection policy in 28
U.S.C. §§1861-2 and instructing each district court to implement
190. King, supra note 17, at 739 (referring to Shaw v. Reno, 113 S.Ct. at
2824-28, which overlooked the benefits of proportional representation by
congressional district racial gerrymandering, focusing instead on the harms of
reinforcing stereotypes and enflaming racial partisanship).
191. Just as no one feels slighted when their numbers are not picked in a
lottery, the sting of exclusion is diminished by the random hand which sets
some potential jurors aside and selects others.
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these general policies in §1863. In addition to the general poli-
cies, §1870 lays out the general rules for peremptory and for-
cause challenges. The following are model statutes articulating
the policy of a lottery system of affirmative selection and model
district court rules implementing the system.
28 U.S.C. §1861. Declaration of policy
It is the policy of the United States that all litigants in Fed-
eral courts entitled to trial by jury shall have the right to grand
and petitjuries selected using a process which combines random
and affirmative selection from a fair cross section of the commu-
nity in the district or division wherein the court convenes. It is
further the policy of the United States that all citizens shall have
the opportunity to be considered for service on grand and petit
juries in the district courts of the United States, and shall have an
obligation to serve as jurors when summoned for that purpose.
28 U.S.C. §1862
No citizen shall be excluded from service as a grand or
petit juror in the district courts of the United States or in
the Court of International Trade on account of race, color,
religion, sex, national origin, or economic status.
28 U.S.C. §1870 Challenges
All challenges for cause or favor, whether to the array or
panel or to individual jurors, shall be determined by the
court.
U.S. District Court of Indiana Northern District Local Rules
L.R. 47.11 Original Voir Dire
The court will conduct voir dire examination in all jury
cases. If counsel desires any particular area of interroga-
tion or questions on voir dire examination, such proposal
shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court at least twenty-
four (24) hours before commencement of trial, or at such
other time as the court may order. The court will give
counsel an opportunity at the completion of original voir
dire to request that the court ask such further questions as
counsel shall deem necessary and proper and which could
not have been reasonably anticipated in advance of trial.
Voir Dire will continue until thirty-six (36) potential jurors
are seated in the qualified venire.
L.R. 47.12 Lottery Ticket Assignment
Each member of the qualified venire will be assigned one
ticket by the court. Each party will be allotted twenty-four
(24) tickets which may be assigned in any manner to mem-
bers of the qualified venire.
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L.R. 47.13 Random Selection of the Petit Jury
The court will randomly draw from the eighty-four (84)
assigned tickets until twelve (12) jurors are chosen for the
petit jury.
V. CONCLUSION
The lingering problems of Batson have not disappeared.
Several of the proposals to improve Batson could be employed
overnight and would make a difference without major overhaul.
Beyond the fine-tuning, many commentators believe that Batson
is fundamentally flawed and have provided several good alterna-
tive methods for selecting juries. Proposals for change have to
combine many components which do not easily fit together-
achieving mixed juries, appearing fair in process, using race-neu-
tral methods, surviving constitutional attack, and overcoming the
inertia of an established process. A modified lottery system uses
random forces as a vehicle to combine those difficult aims into a
working model.
